Is There Room for Low-Cost Carriers in Venezuela? A View on Airport Charges and Aeronautical Fees

The low-cost model does not compete on service but on unit cost. It unbundles the ticket, retains little more than the carriage itself, and charges separately for whatever else the passenger chooses to use. There is, however, one component the carrier cannot unbundle: the charges, fees and taxes that the State adds to the fare. In a legacy market these levies are absorbed by a higher ticket price. In a low-cost market they become visible and, not infrequently, exceed the fare itself.

Whether low-cost operations are viable in Venezuela is therefore, before anything else, a question of how the charging regime is designed.

The International Framework

The starting point is Article 15 of the Chicago Convention. Airports open to public use must be available to the aircraft of all Contracting States on uniform conditions. Charges imposed on foreign aircraft may not exceed those paid by national aircraft engaged in similar international operations. And no charge may be levied solely for the right of transit over, entry into or exit from a State’s territory.

ICAO has developed these principles in its Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services (Doc 9082). The document encourages States to reflect four key principles in their national legislation and air services agreements: non-discrimination, cost-relatedness, transparency and consultation with users.

Doc 9082 does not prohibit differential charges. It makes them subject to three conditions: their purpose and criteria must be transparent, their cost must not be borne by users who do not benefit from them, and, where they are intended to attract new services, they must be offered on a temporary basis only. It further recommends that increases in charges be introduced gradually and that, where several entities levy charges at the same airport, those charges be consolidated, as far as possible, into a single charge or a very small number of charges.

Equally relevant is the distinction ICAO draws between a charge and a tax. A charge is designed and applied specifically to recover the cost of providing facilities and services to civil aviation; anything beyond that falls into the category of taxation. As regards taxes, ICAO’s Policies on Taxation in the Field of International Air Transport (Doc 8632) call on States to reduce to the fullest practicable extent, and to plan to eliminate, all forms of taxation on the sale or use of international air transport, including taxes levied directly on passengers.

The Venezuelan Legal Framework

Venezuelan law does not merely tolerate these standards; it incorporates them by reference.

Article 5 of the Civil Aeronautics Law directs national aviation legislation towards conformity with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices. Article 55 provides that fees for the use of aeronautical infrastructure are to be set in coordination with the National Executive, which must formulate the applicable criteria in accordance with ICAO recommendations. Article 15, for its part, includes 1% of the air ticket amount among the financial resources of the Aeronautical Authority and requires the Authority’s cost structure to serve as the basis for calculating its fees.

It follows that Doc 9082 is more than a comparative reference. It is the benchmark to which Venezuelan law itself refers. It is also the standard against which two resolutions should be assessed: Resolution No. 028/2025, governing the Airport Charges and Incentives System, and Resolution No. 030/2025, governing the INAC Aeronautical Fees System.

What a Low-Cost Carrier Needs from the System

A low-cost carrier’s business case typically relies on operating at off-peak hours, using secondary airports and securing incentives to launch new routes. From a regulatory standpoint, the relevant question is therefore not simply whether incentives are available, but whether they are governed by rules.

An incentive granted on a discretionary, case-by-case basis may be useful at the negotiating table. It gives an operator little basis, however, on which to project unit costs over the medium term. The standard that Venezuelan law has adopted calls for criteria that are published in advance, transparent and time-limited.

The Layered Ticket

An international ticket for a flight departing from Maiquetía carries several layers of charges, each of a different legal nature:

• the departure charge, a fixed amount per passenger;
• the 1% levy in favour of INAC, calculated on the ticket value;
• VAT, which applies to 50% of the value of the ticket sold or issued in Venezuela for each journey departing the country, since international transport is deemed to be partially rendered in Venezuela;
• the Tax on Large Financial Transactions (IGTF), where payment is made in foreign currency.

This layering has two consequences.

The first is regressive. A fixed charge of 63 euros represents around 21% of a 300-euro ticket but 70% of a 90-euro one. Fixed charges therefore bear most heavily on precisely the fares that low-cost carriers seek to offer.

The second concerns legal characterisation. The 1% levy rests on an express statutory basis, but it is not structured as a charge. It is calculated ad valorem on the sale and bears no relation to any specific service provided to the aircraft. Its features are thus closer to those of a tax on the sale of air transport, which is precisely the category that ICAO policy recommends be reduced and ultimately eliminated.

The Low-Cost Carriers Already in the Market

The few low-cost operators that have remained in the Venezuelan market over the past year have done so under specific conditions. Some operate under the designation and operating permit of an established airline group, which spares them the cost and uncertainty of entering the market as stand-alone carriers. Others fly thin, uncontested routes, where the lowest fare ends up including checked baggage and seat selection, so that the low-cost product behaves, in practice, as a hybrid. In both cases, the model has adapted to the market rather than reshaped it.

When the earthquakes of 24 June 2026 forced international traffic to be diverted to regional airports, operating from a secondary airport ceased to be a commercial choice and became an operational necessity, with the cost consequences described below.

The Valencia airport offers a real-time illustration of the layering problem. With traffic at Arturo Michelena up by some 120% during the contingency, the Carabobo State Airports Autonomous Institute introduced, with effect from 13 July 2026, a new contribution of 25 euros per passenger beginning an international journey. The contribution is levied in consideration for the Specialised Passenger Operational Facilitation Service (Servicio Especializado de Facilitación Operacional al Pasajero, SEFOP).

The SEFOP was established as a service complementary to the general airport services already provided, and passengers holding tickets issued before 23 July were required to pay the contribution at the airport. Although the instrument states that the amount rests on a cost study, the contribution raises three concerns: it was created outside the national system, it was added to existing charges, and it was applied to tickets already sold. Each of these sits uneasily with the consolidation, gradualism and transparency that Doc 9082 recommends.

Its weight on a low-cost fare is evident. With fares on the Valencia–Bogotá route advertised from USD 74, taxes included, this contribution alone accounts for more than a third of the price.

The lesson is that low-cost carriers can operate in Venezuela, but not yet as low-cost carriers in the full sense of the term. What the market lacks is not demand, but predictability: stable, consolidated charges and a regulatory environment in which an operator can project its unit costs beyond the next season.

The Passenger and the Final Price

Article 117 of the Venezuelan Constitution guarantees consumers the right to adequate and non-misleading information about the services they acquire. Article 8 of the Civil Aeronautics Law recognises the rights of users of aeronautical services, including transparency and fairness.

For a low-cost carrier, this translates into an obligation to display the final price from the outset, with each component clearly identified. Such transparency serves the passenger, but it also serves the carrier, since the model is only sustainable where users understand what they are purchasing and what they are paying for.

Venezuela may not need to devise a new regime in order to attract low-cost operators. It would be sufficient to apply the standard to which its own legislation already refers. That means charge-modulation criteria published in advance, temporary and transparent incentives for new routes, the consolidation of charges borne by passengers, and a review of ad valorem levies on tickets.

For as long as charges outweigh the fare, low-cost air travel in Venezuela will remain a commercial aspiration rather than a regulatory reality.

Diego Berrizbeitia Grand, Associate